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Federal Sentencing Can Be Made More Just,
If the Sentencing Commission Wants to Make It So
My guess is that most informed observers of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission are pessimistic, or at best only
mildly hopefil, that the commission's newly appointed
members can do much to improve the federal guide-
lines. I disagree. There are grounds for optimism. The
reconstituted commission can make the guidelines
much better. The enabling legislation required none of
the guidelines' worst features - the excessive detail and
rigidity, the 43-level grid, the relevant conduct provi-
sions, the over-emphasis on imprisonment, among
others - and the new commission has authority to recon-
sider and variously revise, repeal, and replace them.
The important question is not whether the new
commission can greatly improve the guidelines, but
whether it will. That will depend on whether the new
commissioners want to make a difference and whether
the new chair is prepared to provide strong leadership.
The new commission has considerable advantages: a
large staff and ample resources, permissive legislation,
an entirely new set of members, and a federal judiciary
that would support many sensible, humane changes. Of
course, there are challenges: inertia, staff resistance to
change, and the cynicism of modem crime control poli-
tics. If the new commission decides at the outset that
no meaningful changes are possible, none will be made.
If, however, the new commission accepts that the cur-
rent guidelines too often produce unjust and arbitrary
results, and sets out to improve the quality of justice in
the federal courts, it has a fighting chance of succeeding.
This comment assumes that the new commission will
decide to try, and suggests that it can leam from five
major mistakes made by the initial commission.
First, the initial commission chose not to act as a
specialized administrative agency somewhat insulated
from day-to-day political pressures, but instead to view
the Department of Justice and conservative members of
Congress as its primary constituency and to adopt poli-
cies sought by that constituency. This was effectively a
rejection of the primary rationale offered by Judge Mar-
vin Frankel and others for creation of a sentencing com-
mission in the first place. The argument was that
sentencing, like any other legal proceeding affecting lib-
erty and property interests, should be subject to rules
(in contrast to the perceived need for ruleless individu-
alization under indeterminate sentencing), but that leg-
islatures are not institutionally well-situated to develop
sentencing rules. Their attention spans are short, issues
come in and out of fashion, staff turnover is high, and
short-term political pressures often result in simplistic
knee-jerk responses to complicated problems. Judge
Frankel urged creation of an administrative agency that
could develop subject matter expertise, a cadre of spe-
cialist staff, an institutional memory, and a policy
approach. If the new commission is to do more than
preside over the current guidelines and make minor
incremental changes, it will need first to become the
kind of independent administrative agency it was
meant to be.
Second, the initial commission succumbed to a
form of hubris not uncommon to Washington and
decided that federal sentencing is unique and that noth-
ing useful could be learned from the sentencing com-
missions then operating in various states. This was a
great pity because lessons could have been learned
from the successful commissions in Minnesota, Wash-
ington, and Oregon, and avoidable problems could have
been foreseen from the more troubled experiences of
early commissions in Pennsylvania, Florida, and New
York. The successful states realized early on the impor-
tance of working closely with judges and other practi-
tioners and bringing them into the guideline
development process. This meant, among other things,
that the guidelines in those states incorporated sound
understanding of problems they were likely to
encounter, and that judges and others were prepared to
accept the bona fides of the new system and to attempt
to work with it. By contrast, federal judges were not
well-integrated into the federal development process
and the results included widespread judicial hostility to
the guidelines and numerous decisions declaring them
unconstitutional. On a more mundane (but crucially
important) technical issue, Washington State's com-
mission considered but then rejected a grid resembling
the federal 43-level grid because they foresaw (from ear-
lier parole guidelines experience) judges' aversion to
something that looked so mechanical and arbitrary and
because they foresaw the high rates of application error
it would engender. Finally, most commissions worried
about the effects of guidelines on plea bargaining and
considered adoption of real offense (relevant conduct)
sentencing as a solution, but rejected it. Had the initial
commission drawn on the state experiences, and
recruited staff from those commissions, it would have
been able to make much better and better-informed pol-
icy choices. If the new commission is to succeed, it will
recognize that federal agencies can sometimes learn
from the states and make staffing and policy-develop-
ment choices accordingly.
Third, the initial commission did not see the fed-
eral judiciary as a major constituency, and as partners,
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and as a result failed to win judges' support for the
guidelines. The evidence for judicial hostility to the
guidelines looks to me incontrovertible. The open rejec-
tion of the guidelines in the pre-Mistretta case law is
one example. The open hostility between commission
members and federal judges in sentencing institutes in
the late i98os and early 199os is another. The various
Federal judicial Center surveys of judges' views show-
ing that large majorities want the guidelines repealed or
fundamentally overhauled is a third. The ongoing
manipulations and evasions of the guidelines by judges
and prosecutors in many district courts is a fourth.
Individual members of the initial commission will,
of course, deny that they purposely excluded the judi-
ciary and judicial views from the guidelines process.
Some commission members in the early days were gen-
uinely perplexed at the widespread and outspoken judi-
cial opposition. I have no complete explanation for why
the initial commission so completely failed to incorpo-
rate judges into the guideline development process.
Partly, I suspect, it was a consequence of fundamental
management failures in the commission. The guide-
lines development process was poorly organized and,
within the commission, contentious, and there may
simply not have been time or energy to engage judges in
the process except as passive reactors to drafts. Partly, it
was a result of the failure to draw on state guidelines
experience and therefore to realize how crucial judicial
participation and support (or at least acquiescence) were
to successful guidelines systems. And partly, it was prob-
ably a product of lack of recent hands-on knowledge of
federal sentencing within the commission. Only one of
the initial commissioners had sentenced federal
offenders in the preceding quarter century and he had
done so only for a few years. Failures of the past, how-
ever, are much less important than lessons for the
future. The lesson for the new commission is that major
changes are much more likely to succeed if they draw on
the experience and views of federal trial judges.
Fourth, the initial commission overlooked funda-
mental jurisprudential differences among various
stages of the criminal justice system, and made it
difficult or impossible for judges openly to satisfy the
distinctive responsibilities of the sentencing stage.
Different things matter, and appropriately influence
decisions, at different stages. The initial commission, to
the contrary, most notably in the relevant conduct rule
and its elaboration, attempted to create a system in
which the same considerations (those encompassed in
the defendant's "actual offense behavior") should guide
decisions at every stage. This is a mistake. Although
prosecutors in their charging, bargaining, and dis-
missal decisions, and judges in their adjudication and
sentencing decisions, are all charged to achieve the con-
viction and punishment of the guilty and the acquittal
or dismissal of the innocent, the nature and balance of
appropriate considerations varies. Whether the defen-
dant can raise an affirmative defense, for example, and
if so successfully, need not be resolved by the prosecu-
tor at the charging stage. These things are decisive at
the adjudication stage, and their likelihood and prov-
ability may be relevant at the bargaining stage. And in
most jurisdictions, defense claims that do not support a
defense at the adjudication stage (such as imperfect
self-defense, actual but legally insufficient provocation,
mental defect or disability short of insanity), are com-
monly considered appropriate grounds for mitigation at
the sentencing stage. The initial commission appears to
have forgotten that justice to the individual offender is
the unique and ultimate goal at the sentencing stage.
The guidelines, to the contrary, indicate that the defen-
dant's age, mental state and condition, physical state
including drug and alcohol dependence, family respon-
sibilities, and other matters that most judges deem
relevant to decisions about deserved and appropriate
sentences, are "not ordinarily relevant." This is espe-
cially ironic because no one would fault a prosecutor for
deciding what offense to charge, or what plea to accept,
on precisely those grounds. By forgetting that the sen-
tencing stage is different from other stages, the initial
commission denied to judges the authority to do the job
that they uniquely are charged to perform. Much of cur-
rent evasion and manipulation of guidelines occurs
because judges believe sentencing is a human process,
not a mechanical one, and a just result is often more
important than one that faithfully reflects the guidelines.
The lesson for the new commission is self-evident.
Fifth, perhaps a different way to make the preced-
ing point, the initial commission, which often claimed
that "equality in sentencing" and "reduction in sentenc-
ing disparity" were its aims, got the concept of equality
wrong. Any respectable theory of equality has two parts:
first, to treat like cases alike, and, second, to treat
different cases differently. The guidelines in many
ways, and particularly in the relevant conduct and indi-
vidual offender circumstances provisions, go to lengths
to honor the equality principle but largely ignore the
difference principle. Since in real life the differences
between cases are often as important to judges (and
others) as their similarities, this is a fundamental fail-
ure. No ethical person, but especially no ethical judge,
is comfortable behaving unjustly, and in the long run a
sentencing system that regularly asks judges to impose
unjust sentences will fall. The new commission can
either preside over the atrophy of the current guide-
lines, or work to reconstitute them in ways that
improve, not diminish, the quality of justice in federal
criminal courts.
If the new commission has the will, it can do
much to improve the guidelines within its current
enabling legislation. It can abandon the relevant con-
duct provisions and move to an offense-of-conviction
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system like every other guidelines system. With aboli-
tion of relevant conduct sentencing, any need for the
current excruciatingly detailed provisions on offense
characteristics and for the 43-level grid will disappear
and these can be greatly simplified. The new commis-
sion can revive the statutory provision (6 994[j]) that
directed the commission to "insure that the guidelines
reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sen-
tence other than imprisonment in cases in which the
defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted
of an offense of violence or an otherwise serious
offense;" the initial commission willfuly nullified this
provision by defining as "serious" many property
offense that previously resulted in nonprison sentences.
The new commission can repeal policy statements in
sections 5HI.i-5HI.6 that forbid judges in most cases
to take account in sentencing of ethically important
differences in offenders' circumstances. And so on. I
have offered these and other suggestions before else-
where, in more detail, and so have others. If the new
commission decides to try to improve the guidelines, it
should look for ideas in many places.
Pessimists will wam the new commission away
from idealism and institutional ambition. Current
crime control politics are symbolic, not substantive,
they will say, and posturing politicians will shoot down
any sensible or humane changes you propose. Maybe.
However, sensible and humane changes are being
made in many states, and the empirical evidence is
weak for the proposition that state politicians are made
of qualitatively better stuff than federal politicians (the
converse is also true). More importantly, if the force of
inertia takes hold and the new commission thinks
small, federal courts will remain afflicted by the federal
guidelines. If the new commission tries great things,
and fails, the federal courts will be no worse off and
foundations will have laid for the changes that some
day will be made. And maybe an ambitious new com-
mission will succeed.
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